This paper analyzes the impact of heterogeneous (social) preferences on the weighting and combination of performance measures as well as on a firm's profitability. We consider rivalry, egoism and altruism as extreme forms within the continuum of possible preferences and show that the principal can typically exploit both the altruistic and rivalistic behavior of his agents. Firm profits reach their maximum value if the agents are differentiated as much as possible in their individual characteristics. We provide further insight; namely, that in order to realize these gains in profitability, it is necessary to reallocate participation in performance measures such that competitive agents are privileged as compared to altruistic agents. In this context, stochastic interdependencies are of importance since they yield overlapping functions of the share parameters, causing additional adaptations in the optimal design of the wage compensation system. 
Motivation
Firms are places where several people work together in order to achieve common goals. Since humans are social beings, they care for one another and bring with them differences in views and tastes. Therefore, not all employees get along with each other equally well, espacially in places of frequent and personal interaction, such as organizations; employees are more productive in some environments than they are in others. One example of this can be observed in team sports like soccer, where individuals might perform particularly well with one team, but are unable to maintain their high level of play after switching to another team. The same can hold true for the opposite situation, in which rather unknown players realize their potential after changing clubs. Similar effects can occur in occupational environments. Beyond the motivational skills of direct leaders, differences in employee preferences seem to be of major importance in these situations.
Therefore two questions arise: (1) what are the driving factors behind the profitability impacts of differences in social preferences, and (2) how can we optimally compose a group of workers in order to guarantee the best possible performance from a superordinate point of view. To answer these questions, we first show how the principal reacts to his agents' homogeneous and heterogeneous social preferences of varying strengths in the provision of incentives; we then deduce formally-derived statements about the consequences of these social preferences with respect to firm profitability.
When studying organizational behavior, economics has typically concentrated on analyzing the structure of the optimal reward system under the assumption that employees behave purely egoistically.
1 Since no differences in preferences were considered, it was difficult to draw conclusions about how to best compose teams.
However, behavioral sciences like psychology 2 , neuro sciences 3 and experimental decision theory 4 show that a large class of people have acquired different motivational structures. These different areas support the idea that economic decisions of some members of society are also determined by social preferences like 1 See Holmström (1979 Holmström ( , 1982 for foundations and Milgrom/Roberts (1992) for an overview. 2 See Henrich (2004) ; Glimcher (2003) and Lévy-Garboua/Meidinger/Rapoport (2008) . 3 See Camerer/Loewenstein/Prelec (2004), pp. 570 et sqq. and Fehr/Fischbacher/Kosfeld (2005) . 4 See Fehr/Falk (2002) ; Fehr/Fischbacher (2002) and Fehr/Schmidt (2003) as well as Camerer (2003) , pp. 43-113.
altruism, inequity aversion and reciprocity 5 . Generally, preferences are designated as social "…if a person not only cares about the material resources allocated to her but also cares about the material resources allocated to relevant reference agents" 6 .
Employing this definition, various types of motivational structures are differentiated in economic literature, 7 using the effect of another person's changing payoff on the individual's own utility as a criterion. For our object of investigation, we focus on rivalry, egoism and altruism since they represent three groups within a continuum in which the other agent's payoff is always evaluated negatively (rivalry) at the one extreme and is always evaluated positively (altruism) at the other extreme, independent of the overall distribution of wages. Furthermore, as we will see below, rivalry and altruism can be modelled in comparable terms, 8 each time including egoism as a limit, which enables us to employ the same formal frame for analyzing the meaning of differences between the intensity of either equal or different types of (social) preferences.
Our results point to the importance of variety in the agents' motivational structures.
We show that the principal can use such differences to increase his own profits. As a prerequisite, he must shift the weightings of performance measures between his decentralized divisions in a way such that the (more) rivalistic agent gains at the expense of the other agent. The less the latter agent values the consequences of this measure negatively, the higher the firm's profits, implying that the principal can usually make use of differences in motivational structures, but cannot profit from equally strong homogeneous social preferences. This contradicts our intuition that altruistic agents, who do not begrudge others their monetary well-being, make the largest contributions, and, therefore are the most important members of teams.
Instead, rivalistic persons are equally significant as part of a mixture of different characters.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 depicts the framework of our analysis, with section 2.1 emphasizing conceptual preliminaries, including a structuring of the essential determinants that characterize the underlying problem.
Section 2.2 relates our work to previous literature. The theoretical model and its basic assumptions are presented in section 2.3. Sections 3 and 4 contain our main results.
First, the consequences of accounting for different social preferences in the structure of the optimal wage compensation system are examined in section 3. Then, given the previous results, section 4 considers the impacts of heterogeneous (social) preferences on firm profitability. Section 5 contains the implications of our theoretical analysis and explores consequences for further research.
Framework of Analysis

Conceptual Framework and Determinants of the Problem
The impact of social preferences on the optimal structure of the principal's incentive system as well as on firm profits may depend on both external and internal determinants. Organizational, production and environmental conditions are of particular importance. Organizational conditions are relevant since we assume that agents belong to different departments. Within a firm, an employee's most important connections exist in a vertical direction to his superior and in a horizontal direction to his colleagues on the same hierarchical level (see Figure 1 ). Both types of relationships may impact an employee's performance. Since we are mainly interested in the consequences of agents' heterogeneous preferences on firm performance, we only consider psychological interdependencies between horizontally-aligned agents on the same hierarchical layer. Technological (inter-) dependencies in the production process arise if an agent's performance measure is affected not only by his own activities, but also by the efforts of agents in other departments (and vice versa) . Environmental stochastic dependencies are present if the two departments' profits depend on correlated error terms; for example, external conditions of the market or the general business cycle may result in such a relationship. Therefore, the influences of different preferences in a decentralized organization can be analysed for cases of internal technological and/or external stochastic dependence as well as independence (see Figure 2 ).
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Insert Figure 2 here
Figure 2: Determinants of the research problem.
In this paper, we will ignore the influence of technological production dependencies in order to reduce complexity. Instead, we focus on the interrelation of stochastic and psychological dependencies. 9 However, our main results concerning the impact of social preferences on firm profitability continue to hold in the case of technological dependencies.
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The structure and impact of preference (inter-) dependencies are a feature of the personal traits of the agents. Social preferences are typically related to one or several other persons. In our model, two agents in different departments on the same hierarchical level (figure 1) may have rivalistic, egoistic or altruistic preferences. Thus, one obtains three homogeneous and six heterogeneous combinations (see Figure 3 ). To clearly examine the issue, we first concentrate on the extreme cases of rivalry and altruism; we then further distinguish between one-sided (RE or ER and AE or EA) and two-sided homogeneous (RR and AA) social preferences. These combinations are considered separately, taking into account the fact that the strength of both agents' social preferences can vary. Then, the case of two-sided heterogeneous social preferences (RA or AR) is examined. Doing so enables us to draw previously unobserved conclusions regarding the optimal composition of a team.
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Relation to the Literature
Previous research on social preferences in principal-agent models can be differentiated into models that concentrate on vertical comparisons of an agent with his principal 11 and those which focus on horizontal comparisons between agents on the same horizontal layer. 12 In the latter case, authors usually focus on the optimal design of the wage compensation system. 13 The question of whether the principal can make use of his agents' social preferences is explicitly addressed in only a few 9 For a formal analysis of the optimal contract design, taking into account social preferences and technological as well as stochastic inderdependencies, see Sandner (2008b Concerning the optimal provision of incentives, it is known from earlier contributions that preferences for inequity aversion (Itoh (2004) ; Bartling/von Siemens (2005) ) as well as envy or rivalry (Bartling/von Siemens (2006) ; Dierkes/Harreiter (2006) ) lead the principal to provide his agents with more equitable so-called flat wage contracts.
In addition to that, Itoh (2004) compares the advantageousness of team-based compensation and relative performance evaluation under the assumption of identical agents. Although not the primary objective, our work also contributes in this context, since we focus on how to balance performance measures in the presence of various social preferences as well as stochastic dependencies. 19 Beyond that, in contrast to most of the existing studies, 20 we also allow for differences in the agents' other personality traits apart from their motivational structures. 21 Doing so, we are able to deliver in-depth insights into the overlapping functions of the principal's share rates with their motivational implications that have not so far been achieved.
Prerequisites and Structure of the Basic Model
To analyse the impact of diverse preferences, we assume a LEN model with one principal P and two agents i ( B , A i = ), each of whom leads his own department. The profits i x of the two departments, which depend on the agents' (= departments) non- Itoh (2004) . 18 For early foundations of the LEN model see Spremann (1987) and Holmstrom/Milgrom (1987) . Assessments of its applicability based on the underlying assumptions are given in Ewert/Wagenhofer (1993) as well as Hemmer (2004) . 19 For examinations in the case of purely egoistical preferences, see Banker/Datar (1989); Feltham/Xie (1994) and Datar/Kulp/Lambert (2001) . For an overview, see Christensen/Feltham (2005) . 20 See, for example, Itoh (2004) and Bartling/von Siemens (2006) . 21 Most of the studies concerned with horizontal social preferences assume, for example, risk neutrality. See Itoh (2004) ; Bartling/von Siemens (2004 ; Rey Biel (2007) and Neilson/Stowe (2008) . By contrast, we allow for varying degrees of risk aversion. Furthermore, differences in the agents' productivities as well as (marginal) effort costs are explicitly considered.
environmental influences, add up to firm profits, denoted by x . Therefore, the profit functions based on (isolated) production functions with productivity coefficients i p are:
The error terms are normally distributed with a mean of zero, variance 
The principal optimizes his objective function with respect to the wage compensation coefficients in (3). Depending on the endogenously determined values of B α and A β three different compensation schemes may arise: (a) individual compensation for
). The principal and the agents have exponential utility functions. Since the principal is assumed to be risk-neutral, he maximizes the expected value of his residuum after wage payments:
Both agents are presumed to be strictly risk-averse. The strength of their risk aversion is measured by the constant coefficients 0 r A > and 0 r B > , where higher values of i r imply a higher degree of risk aversion.
Three types of preferences are taken into account: egoism, rivalry and altruism.
Egoistic or selfish agents look only at their own material interests when choosing effort levels a and b , whereas rivalistic and altruistic agents also consider the effects of their decisions on the well-being of another agent. In the subsequent analysis, it is assumed that social preferences refer only to the agents' monetary wage payments. 
Since both sorts of social preferences can vary in their strength of development, the above specifications represent a continuum of different behavioral types, each of which includes egoism as a special case for either 0 k i = or 0 n i = and 1 m i = :
In the case of rivalry, the social preference term (5) Unlike rivalry, which is considered above, altruism as described by the formula given in equation (6) For the latter, the social preference term in (6) can be rewritten as:
clarifying that under these circumstances, a weighting of remuneration as in (6) corresponds to a situation in which the agents compare themselves with one another.
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The forms of social preference given in equations (5) and (6) 22 This specification has also been employed by Andreoni/Miller (2002) ; using it, they were able to explain altruistic behavior for 20% of the participants in a dictator game. 23 The exposition in (9) corresponds to the one in Bester/Güth (1998) ), however, the agent is even willing to forgo part of his own remuneration if the other in turn receives more. This form of altruism can also be called selfless behavior. The main difference between the specifications (8a) and (8b) lies in a shift of the reference point. In the case of (8a), selfless behavior begins at 1 n i = , whereas in the case of (8b), it begins at 5 , 0 n i = .
Analyzing the Structure of the Optimal Incentive System
Solving the Basic Model for the Optimal Incentive System
Given the stated assumptions, the agents' utility functions can be written using certainty equivalent notation. In the case of rivalry, one finds that:
For altruism, we analogously find that:
In either situation, both agents choose effort levels a and b in order to maximize their certainty equivalents (11) or (12). The principal anticipates this behavior, restricting his optimization problem through the so-called incentive compatibility constraints. The corresponding reaction functions are for two-sided altruism ( AA ). The principal further has to consider the participation constraints, implying that each agent at least has to receive his reservation utility, normalized to zero in our model. Given these limitations, the principal maximizes his utility function (4) over the wage compensation parameters
Performing the typical optimization steps yields: The corresponding results for altruism and heterogeneous social preferences are obtained by applying the formal relations given in equation (10). From the reference case of purely egoistical behavior, it is known that both agents' wages are lower for higher values of the respective other's performance measure. This so-called relative performance evaluation is useful in the presence of stochastic dependencies because it enables us to filter out the risks which can be traced back to common occurrences that lie outside the agents' responsibilities and affect both of their wage payments equally (Holmström (1982) ). Depending on the type(s) of social preferences, the corresponding weightings of performance measures are differentially divided between the two of them, giving rise to major changes in the optimal design of the incentive system. It must be observed that the principal's decision problem in the situation of purely egoistical behavior can be broken down into two problems, one for agent A and one for agent B. In a situation with differing (social) preferences but uncorrelated error terms ( 0 = ρ ), it can again be broken down, but this time into one term for performance measure A x and another for B x . The simultaneous consideration of psychological as well as stochastic dependencies means that each share rate fulfills several functions at a time. As a consequence, division of the principal's optimization problem is no longer possible. In order to clarify our exposition, we proceed by separately analyzing the cases of one-and two-sided social preferences.
Functions and Interrelations of the Profit Share Rates in the Case of One-Sided Rivalry
Analysis of the First Department's Share Rates with Rivalry
In the case of one-sided rivalry (
) the optimal expressions for share rates A α and A β in equations (15) and (17) can be reduced to:
β in equation (22) simultaneously fulfills two complementing functions:
• insurance parameter to reduce the wage compensation risk carried by agent B, and
• intrinsic motivation for the competitive agent A.
Considering agent A's reaction function in equation (13), one can observe that negative values of A β have a performance-enhancing effect for him. This is due to a reduction in agent B's wage compensation, leading to greater rivalry and thus a higher motivation for A. The ensuing increased efforts from A cause increasing effort costs and thus the principal must reduce A's direct incentive intensity by lessening A α . Furthermore, the relevant wage compensation risk of agent A is decreased by this action. Correspondingly, equation (21) can be written as:
At the same time, because A β no longer has only a risk-reducing effect in its function as an insurance parameter for agent B, the absolute value of A β is lowered compared to the reference point of purely egoistical behavior. When taking rivalry into account, A β also has a risk-increasing effect for agent A, as is indicated by the emboldened terms in equation (24):
Less negative values of A β reduce the amount of risk borne by agent A.
Consequently, when determining A β , it is the necessary for the principal to trade off between the optimal incentive intensity on one side and optimal risk sharing on the other. The difference from the reference case of completely egoistical agents is that (16) and (18) become:
Unlike the previous analysis concerning A β , the principal needs to trade off two opposing effects when determining B α :
• filtering out risks in the incentive system of agent A, and
• reducing the possible negative consequences caused by agent A's rivalry.
From previous agency models, it is known that stochastic dependencies further the use of relative performance evaluation, leading to negative values of B α , while agent A's rivalry causes the opposite effect by enhancing the application of team-based compensation. Thus, determination of which of these two basic types of compensation will be favored should be considered when both forms of interdependencies occur at the same time. Figure 4 Thus, relative performance evaluation is not very powerful. In addition to this comparatively small risk reduction potential for 0 B < α , augmenting B α above zero enables the principal to ensure that agent A will always benefit by participating in higher wage payments to agent B. 28 This measure, which is caused by A's rivalry, increases this agent's utility and therefore leads to higher firm profits. As a consequence, the principal implements a team-based wage compensation scheme.
However, if the threshold value for the correlation coefficient * ρ is exceeded, the positive risk-reducing effects overpower the potentially negative consequences of rivalry and thus relative performance evaluation becomes advantageous.
The reallocations cause the principal to lower agent B's incentive intensity B β due to A's rivalry. Correspondingly, the sum of B β in equation (26) and the first term of the mathematical expression for B α in equation (25) is identical to agent B's incentive intensity in the case of purely egoistical behavior.
Functions and Interrelations of the Profit Share Rates in the Case of One-Sided Altruism
Analysis of the First Department's Share Rates with Altruism
Since the analysis in the case of one-sided altruism ( AE ) is analogous to the hitherto considerations, the following exposition concentrates on pointing out the major differences that arise in the interpretations. Share rate A β simultaneously fulfills the same two functions as in the situation of rivalry. However, unlike the previous analysis, both effects work in opposite directions. 
Analysis of the Second Department's Share Rates with Altruism
Agent A's altruism enables an increase in explicit incentives for agent B by increasing his variable wage compensation component B β . This is due to the fact that the altruistic agent's utility is positively affected by the other agent's total remuneration causing the altruistic agent to be willing to forgo his own monetary incentives. Hence, the altruistic agent's variable wage payment can be reduced by lessening B α .
Consequently, the mathematical relation
holds. Thus, the principal's scheme can be configured to subsidize the greater efforts of the egoistical agent by exploiting the other agent's altruism. The resulting higher risk premiums are compensated through the fixed remuneration components. equation (27) . In contrast to the rivalry situation analyzed previously, B α is negative, even in the absence of social preferences. Therefore, there is no need for a trade-off between relative performance evaluation and team-based compensation. Both agents are rewarded relatively to one another, irrespective of the strength of agent A's altruism and the degree to which the error terms in their performance measures are correlated.
Combined Effects in the Case of Two-Sided Social Preferences
If both agents take the other's wage payments into account, their respective social preferences simultaneously affect all four share rates; the result is overlapping effects. Table 1 shows that a more developed sense of rivalry on the part of both agents (RR ) operates in the same direction for all four share rates. It becomes apparent that both agents' "coefficients of effective sympathy", which are used as a measure of the strength of their respective altruism, also operate in the same direction for all four share rates. Accordingly, each agent's own performance measure receives greater weight in his wage compensation system as he places more weight on the other agent's remuneration relative to his own reward. In contrast, each agent's share in the other's performance measure is more and more reduced as his "coefficient of effective sympathy" adopts higher values. Finally, the impact of varying heterogeneous social preferences, i.e., altruism for agent A and rivalry for agent B ( AR ), is shown in Table 3 . 
The Influence of Social Preferences on the Profitability of the Firm
This section examines the maximum attainable firm profits for all possible combinations of the different types of (social) preferences considered in our model.
The exposure seeks to answer two interrelated questions. First, we identify the conditions under which the principal can make use of his agents' social preferences for every constellation. Building on the results, we turn to the central concern of our paper by broaching the issue of the optimal combination of different types of (social) preferences for which firm profits take their maximum value. Throughout the analysis, we assume that the principal optimally designs his wage compensation system according to the principles depicted above. Therefore, the maximum value of his objective function is calculated by substituting the optimal values for the share rates in equations (15)- (18) 
The Profitability of One-Sided Rivalry
For the analysis of one-sided rivalry, we assume that agent A behaves competitively while agent B is completely egoistical ( RE ). The optimal value of the objective function (28) thus reduces to: The first term in (28) and (29) The total impact of agent A's rivalry is determined by which of the two previously described effects dominates. However, to answer this question, one not only has to consider the relative impact of the factors influenced by social preferences, but also the contributions both agents would make in a situation of completely egoistical behavior. Therefore, two cases should be differentiated in the following analysis. First, assume that the agents are identical except for their (social) preferences. For this case, Figure 5 illustrates the optimal value of the principal's objective function subject to the strength of agent A's rivalry as well as the strength of the stochastic dependency. By contrast, if agent B is of greater importance to the superordinate's goal, A's ambition can be harmful since it entails the need for the principal to privilege him over B in terms of shares in performance measure B x , leading to lessened efforts from the more capable agent B. Therefore, when agents who make only small contributions to firm profits behave competitively, they cause trouble by requiring the necessity for the principal to pay them increased attention at the cost of discriminating against other high performers. The previous analysis leads to the following result: 
The Profitability of One-Sided Altruism
Altruism is usually perceived as a positive trait, since it involves concern for the wellbeing of one's fellow men and does not begrudge the success of others.
Accordingly, the altruistic agent's reaction functions in equation (14) shows that he enhances his efforts if the respective other agent's share in his own performance measure becomes larger. He is therefore willing to bear additional effort costs if the other agent's expected utility rises. Consequently, this section examines whether the principal can always profit from an agent's altruistic behavior or if there is a trade-off similar to the one observed in the analysis of rivalry described above. The optimal value of the principal's objective function in the case of altruism becomes: indicating that arbitrarily high firm profits can theoretically be induced in the extreme case of the altruistic agent putting the same value on both of the agents' profits in his own utility function.
The analysis of the total effect that one-sided altruism has on firm profits again proceeds in two steps. First, observe that when referring to a situation in which agent A, despite his altruism, puts unchanged weight on his own wage payments ( 1 m A = ), it is clear that there are no opposing effects and the principal can always benefit from his social preference. Second, the possibility of negative consequences on the achievement of objectives exists only for the case in which the egoistical agent B contributes much more to firm profits than the altruistic agent A. The prerequisites, however, are that agent A puts much less weight on his own wage payments ( 1 m A << ) than he would if he behaved completely egoistically, and, at the same time, the relative importance of both agents' compensation must not become too similar 
The Influence of Two-Sided Homogeneous Social Preferences on Firm Profits
The previous two sections have assumed that only one agent is endowed with a social preference; in such cases it was shown that the principal can usually make use of the resulting behavior. In the next two sections the analysis is extended by assuming that both agents have acquired social preferences. This section examines homogeneous social preferences RR or AA , while the next section considers the case of heterogeneous social preferences AR . The analysis proceeds by taking the weighting factors in the principal's optimal goal value (see equations (28) and (30)) that are determined by social preferences apart in order to analyze each of their components. Then, the total effect is examined. This implies that the principal cannot achieve an advantageous trade-off by means of an adequately designed wage compensation system in a case where both agents simultaneously behave rivalistically. Every reallocation leads to an improvement on one side but, at the same time, creates a deficit on the other. The same argument holds true for a situation with two-sided altruism. In this case, the principal can only profit from each agent's altruism if he augments the other agent's incentive intensity while simultaneously reducing the altruist's share in the same performance measure.
This reduction, however, decreases the other agent's intrinsic motivation if he also behaves altruistically. Therefore, the positive effects of the heightened incentive intensity are partly wasted. Again, the principal's reallocation caused by one agent's altruism has negative effects on the other agent if he behaves equally altruistically since neither agent wants to be privileged over the other. In both cases, the principal's actions to account for each of his agents' social preferences contradict one another, meaning that he cannot benefit from the resulting behaviors if both social preferences are of equal strength. 37 This analysis leads to the following result: However, higher aspiration levels A l and B l always lead to reduced efforts from both agents and therefore have a negative impact on firm profitability. This confirms our assumption that high expectations of one's own accomplishments are debilitating since they prevent employee satisfaction. Therefore, from a firm's point of view, agents with low aspiration levels are generally more productive and hence more beneficial for the firm. If the principal could choose which agents should be endowed with social preferences, the ideal case would be the agent who exhibits higher productivity, smaller marginal costs, smaller risk aversion and a less variable performance measure. This agent would make a larger contribution to firm profits, even in the case of purely egoistical behaviour; this effect would be further amplified by the principal's reallocations due to his agents' social preferences.
The Profitability of Two-Sided Heterogeneous Social Preferences for the Firm
In the previous analysis, firm profits reached their maximum when only one agent had a predisposition, preferably a strong one, for either rivalry or altruism, and the homogeneous social preference of the respective other agent was zero, meaning that he was fully egoistic. Therefore, we examine whether firm profitability can be further enhanced if the two agents are endowed with heterogeneous social preferences. The principal's optimal objective function value takes the form: (13)). As a consequence, agent B's willingness to perform and therefore the firm's profits, increase.
To examine the total effect, firm profits are exemplified in dependence of the strength of altruism A n as well as the strength of rivalry B k (figure 7). 38 For simplification, it is again assumed that the weighting factors in agent A's utility function sum up to one. Finally, it should be mentioned that all obtained results regarding the ideal composition of groups within a firm suppose that the principal designs his wage compensation system optimally according to equations (15)- (18). This includes the assumption that separate performance measures for each of the two agents are available and that the principal can observe their (social) preferences.
Implications and Further Research
The question of whether new insights gained in experimental decision theory and neuroscience change economic theories is an important issue of modern research. In this paper, we analyzed the influence of social preferences on the incentive system in a decentralized organisation, which is necessary since not all people behave completely egoistically in reality. Unlike other research in the field, this paper also takes altruism into account. Thus, this study considers three widespread types of preferences (rivalry, egoism and altruism) and the differences between them.
Furthermore, we provide evidence for the importance of internal and external conditions. In particular, we show that environmental stochastic dependencies, which may be caused by market cycles or other external conditions, influence the results.
Through simultaneous consideration with social preferences, several types of (inter-) dependencies intertwine. For the sake of simplicity, the influence of internal dependencies is excluded from this paper.
In order to optimize the wage compensation system, a company as the principal must react to the agents' preferences through a reallocation of their participation in the performance measures. The analysis shows that when doing so the different functions of the parameters of the incentive system have to be balanced. A central result of our paper is the insight that a firm may increase its profit by adjusted compensation. Both, altruism and rivalry include an intrinsic motivation which can be exploited by the principal. However, altruism of the agents is not inherently advantageous. This seems surprising at first glance; however, the driving force behind the chance to increase profits lies in the differences between the preferences and their strengths of development for various agents. A principal and, therefore, a firm, can use these differences in rivalry as well as altruism. In the first case, it relates to the motivating effects of competition, which exist in several areas of human society, including economics and sports. In the latter case of altruistic agents, the firm does not need to pay all agents equally for motivation purposes, as it would in a situation of pure self-interest. Therefore, incentives can be partly shifted toward the egoistic or rivalistic agent(s). This important result indicates that firms as hierarchical organizations have a chance to use intrinsic motivations in a special manner through combination of their agents and the design (optimization) of their wage compensation system.
The insight that differences in preferences can be profitable and hence can be 'managed' by a firm is not only relevant for wage compensation, it also indicates that ethical aspects should be considered in problems of business administration. These results are important for decisions regarding organizational structure, the distribution of tasks and decision authority within a firm, the filling of management positions and the selection of persons in business teams including a board. Thus, since preferences determine human behavior to a high degree, the different preference types may affect many decisions within a firm.
A special and perhaps unexpected result of our analysis is that a group of people sharing equally rivalistic or altruistic preferences is usually less efficient than a team composed of members with only egoistic or differing preferences. In our model, the highest profit can be realized by agents with the largest difference in their social preferences. This result raises two questions. First, should firms combine persons with extremely different social preferences in their (project) teams and as managers of their departments? Second, to what degree can such a policy be realized?
Answers to these questions should take the prerequisites of our theoretical model into account. Furthermore, our main result conflicts with the intuitive notion, as supported by some empirical research, that teams with identical preferences seem to be most successful in specific areas or situations.
All of these aspects indicate that further research is needed to analyze the relevance and practicability of the assumptions defined in our formal examination. For example, it seems important that we use a theoretical model without imposing limited liability constraints and assume that a firm can realize very different compensation parameters for each of the two agents. The last point contradicts principles of equal treatment in compensation. Thus, empirical research on, for example, the distribution of (social) preferences in companies, their determinants and their stability, is required.
The degree to which moral ideas and principles of equality, justice, etc., influence the behavior in firms and therefore limit the construction of wage compensation systems should also be examined. Additionally, our results need to be scrutinized by empirical investigations to identify relevant areas and the degree to which firms can use differences in personal preferences to increase profits.
In reality, people may be driven by a mixture of rivalistic, egoistic and altruistic motivations. Since a firm can take advantage of the differences between the individual preferences, it may be adequate to assume only selfish preferences on average for some problems. However, in many situations, this assumption does not suffice. More and more, behavioral science research has been revealing differences in people's preferences and providing insights into the circumstances under which these differences are reflected in individual behavior. These advances should also be taken into consideration by future theoretical and empirical research in business administration.
Solving the participation constraints for 0 α , 0 β and plugging the resulting values together with the expressions for a , b (equation (13)) in the principal's utility function (4) yields his optimization problem: the first-order conditions, which, after some rearranging, can be written as: B. Calculation of the principal's optimal goal function value in a situation with rivalry
We calculate the maximum value of the objective function by plugging the optimal values for the share rates (see equations (15)- (18) 
